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Abstract 
Despite the growing interest in dispositional reasoning as a construct and determinant 
of good raters ("good judges"), its measurement still requires attention. We address two 
measurement issues in the present study. First, this study tests a hierarchical model as a more 
parsimonious account for dispositional reasoning than component- or general factor-models 
that were examined in earlier studies. So, this provides a more comprehensive test of the 
different measurement models underlying dispositional reasoning data. Second, we assess the 
measurement invariance of dispositional reasoning measure scores across two different 
populations of assessors that are often trained and used in workplace assessments, namely 
psychology students (N = 161) and managers (N = 160). Results showed that dispositional 
reasoning is well represented as componential in nature, with a higher-order construct 
underlying three lower-order components. A comparison of managers and psychology 
students through measurement invariance analysis showed relatively similar factor structures 
underlying dispositional reasoning scores across these groups, but metric invariance could be 
only partially established. 
Keywords: dispositional reasoning, judgment, interviews, accuracy, hierarchical CFA
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A Closer Look at the Measurement of Dispositional Reasoning:  
Dimensionality and Invariance Across Assessor Groups 
The characteristics of the good raters ("good judges") have intrigued researchers and 
practitioners for a long time (for example, see Funder, 2012; Taft, 1955; Vernon, 1933). 
Recent efforts to explain individual differences in judgment accuracy have shown promise 
for dispositional reasoning as a key determinant of what makes a good judge. Dispositional 
reasoning can be defined as a rater's complex knowledge of traits, behaviors, and situations’ 
potential to elicit traits into manifest behaviors (Christiansen, et al., 2005). Research 
(Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, 2005; De Kock, Lievens, & Born, 
2015) revealed that interviewers’ dispositional reasoning was the strongest predictor of 
accuracy among a set of individual differences that included demographics, personality, and 
general cognitive ability. Moreover, it showed discriminant validity with personality traits 
and convergence with measures of cognitive ability (rs =.43 and .68, in the two studies cited, 
respectively). 
Conceptually, dispositional reasoning has three distinguishable components: trait 
induction is the ability to know how traits manifest themselves in behavior; trait 
extrapolation is an understanding of how traits and their behavioral manifestations naturally 
co-vary; and trait contextualization refers to the ability to identify situations that are relevant 
for expressing traits (De Kock, et al., 2015). Importantly, each of these components is not 
measured through a self-report questionnaire. Instead, Christiansen et al. measured these 
components via a multiple choice test in which people, for instance, have to assign adjectives 
to constructs (Big Five) or determine which situation is the best for observing specific trait-
related behavior related to constructs such as complexity or sociability (see also examples in 
Tett & Guterman, 2000). 
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Despite the growing interest in dispositional reasoning as a construct and determinant 
of a good judge, its measurement still requires further attention. The measurement drawbacks 
of earlier studies are twofold. First, although Christiansen et al. (2005) conceptualized 
dispositional reasoning as consisting of three components, their measure “did not permit 
reliable subscale scores to be computed for the hypothesized domains” (p. 143). To address 
this issue, De Kock, et al. (2015) revised the original measure to yield reliable subscale 
scores and found that a three-factor solution fitted the data reasonably well. However, 
measures of ability in the same conceptual domain often show both ‘positive manifold’ (Horn 
& Cattell, 1966) and an hierarchical nature (see Carroll, 2003, for a review), where broad 
factors at a higher stratum affect narrow factors at lower strata. As dispositional reasoning 
exhibits characteristics of an ability measure (De Kock, et al., 2015) it may also potentially 
have an hierarchical configuration—including a general factor influencing the three specific 
components. Therefore, this study tests a hierarchical model as a more parsimonious account 
for the underlying structure of dispositional reasoning scores than component- or general 
factor-models that were examined in earlier studies. This provides a more comprehensive test 
of the different measurement models underlying dispositional reasoning data. 
A second measurement issue is that prior dispositional reasoning studies used two 
different populations of judges, namely either psychology students1 (Christiansen, et al., 
2005; Powell & Bourdage, 2016; Powell & Goffin, 2009) or managers (De Kock, et al., 
2015). From a practice perspective, a focus on either of these two populations makes indeed a 
lot of sense because both groups constitute the typical pools of assessors that are trained and 
used in workplace assessments (Krause & Thornton, 2009; Lievens, 2001a). Evidence also 
suggests that combining psychologists and managers produces the greatest predictive validity 
(Gaugler, Rosenthal, Thornton, & Bentson, 1987). However, only when the measurement 
structure is invariant between these two populations, dispositional reasoning scores can be 
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compared and merged across these groups of assessors. Therefore, it is important to know 
whether the dispositional reasoning measure works equally well for both populations. 
These two unclear measurement features of dispositional reasoning impede progress 
not only on the aforementioned conceptual issues, but it has also practical implications for the 
use of the dispositional measure. For example, assessor training interventions may be tailored 
to target specific components (induction, extrapolation, or contextualization) if these 
components are distinguishable. Moreover, lack of measurement invariance of dispositional 
reasoning scores across rater populations might require developing different measures for the 
respective groups (i.e., managers vs. psychologists). 
In short, this study aims to contribute to the small albeit growing literature on 
dispositional reasoning as a key construct by investigating its dimensionality through a more 
comprehensive set of confirmatory factor analysis models (hierarchical, component models, 
and general factor-models). In addition, we examine the invariance of this measure across 
two samples (psychology students and managers) that are often trained in workplace 
assessments. 
Study Background 
Dispositional Reasoning: Conceptualization and Research 
Dispositional reasoning is defined as complex knowledge of traits, behaviors and the 
potential of situations to elicit traits into manifest behaviors (for a recent discussion, see De 
Kock, Lievens, & Born, 2015). Dispositional reasoning may allow good judges to process 
behavioral information towards accurate trait inferences. Research (Christiansen, Wolcott-
Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, 2005; De Kock, Lievens, & Born, 2015) showed that 
interviewers’ dispositional reasoning was the strongest predictor of accuracy among a set of 
individual differences that included demographics, personality, and general cognitive ability. 
In both these studies, participants watched videotaped segments of individuals responding to 
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employment interview questions and judged the characteristics of the video interviewees. 
Accuracy was measured by comparing raters’ judgments with those of ‘true scores’, which 
were derived from targets’ self-reported personality dimensions (Christiansen et al., 2005), or 
subject matter expert ratings of interviewees’ performance (De Kock, et al., 2015). Moreover, 
dispositional reasoning scores showed discriminant validity with personality traits and 
convergence with measures of cognitive ability (rs =.43 and .68, in the two studies cited, 
respectively). Finally, in one of these studies (De Kock et al., 2015) dispositional reasoning 
showed incremental validity (ΔR2 = .09, p = .004; small to medium effect size, Cohen’s 
f2=.11) over general mental ability to predict a key accuracy criterion (Borman’s Differential 
Accuracy scores). As such, these findings speak for the practical use of dispositional 
reasoning measures to screen and select assessors in organizations. Other research 
investigated whether it is possible to develop assessors’ dispositional reasoning through 
training. Early attempts (Powell & Bourdage, 2016; Powell & Goffin, 2009) to enhance one 
of the components of dispositional reasoning—so-called behavior-trait knowledge, also 
known as ‘induction’ (De Kock, et al., 2015)—with training, have been unsuccessful, 
however. 
Competing Models of Dispositional Reasoning 
Christiansen, et al. (2005) conceptualized dispositional reasoning as consisting of 
three components. However, their subscales of the different components were too short to 
provide reliable subscale scores. So, they assumed a general-factor model. De Kock et al. 
(2015) extended the original measure to yield reliable subscale scores and found that a three-
factor solution (component model) fitted the data reasonably well. Apart from testing these 
models, this study tests for the first time also an hierarchical model as a more parsimonious 
account for dispositional reasoning than the component- or general factor-models that were 
examined in earlier studies. 
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Model 1: General-factor model. In a general-factor model underlying dispositional 
reasoning scores (see Figure 1), assessors’ procedural and declarative knowledge structures 
that relate to multiple domains—in this case, the areas of knowledge of behaviors, traits, and 
situations—are encapsulated in a single broad factor. For example, items that measure one 
component (e.g., trait induction) overlap with items that tap into another (e.g., trait 
extrapolation), resulting in a broad dispositional reasoning latent variable that causes variance 
in all items, irrespective of the component that a specific item was designed to measure. 
Therefore, the model assumes no distinction between separate dispositional reasoning 
components.  
In the broader literature, a well-known example of a general factor model is 
Spearman’s (1904) ‘g-theory’, that is, the view that performance at one type of cognitive task 
tends to be comparable to performance at other cognitive tasks. General factor models also 
exist in other literatures such as general affectivity (Cropanzano, Weiss, Hale, & Reb, 2003). 
Model 2: Three components (1st order). In a component-model of dispositional 
reasoning, specific abilities related to understanding traits, behaviors, and situations cluster 
into three facets. So, in such a model, dispositional reasoning has three distinguishable 
components: trait induction is the ability to know how traits manifest themselves in behavior; 
trait extrapolation is an understanding of how traits and their behavioral manifestations 
naturally co-vary; and trait contextualization refers to the ability to identify situations that are 
relevant for expressing traits. In a component-model (see Figure 2), items load onto these 
three separate dimensions, with no cross-loadings allowed. 
Componential views of constructs are also encountered in the psychology literature. 
Examples of componential models can be found for emotional intelligence (Mayer, Caruso, 
& Salovey, 1999) and for other ‘specific’ intelligences (Gardner, 1993). 
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Model 3: Hierarchical model (2nd order). Dispositional reasoning can also be 
considered a hierarchically-ordered construct, with a general factor influencing the three 
specific components (see Figure 3). An hierarchical structure for dispositional reasoning 
suggests a broad dispositional reasoning latent construct (i.e., higher-order factor) causing 
variance in the three specific components (i.e., lower-order factors).  
In the broader literature, measures of ability in the same conceptual domain often 
show an hierarchical nature (see Carroll, 2003, for a review). For instance, in the intelligence 
literature, the early general (g) versus specific (sn) intelligence debate has given way to a 
consensus view of the hierarchical nature of abilities (see Carroll, 2003, for a review) where 
broad factors at a higher stratum affect narrow factors at lower strata. 
Rater Groups and Measurement Invariance 
As noted above, prior dispositional reasoning studies used two different populations 
of assessors, namely either psychology students (Christiansen, et al., 2005; Powell & 
Bourdage, 2016; Powell & Goffin, 2009) or managers (De Kock, et al., 2015). Both of these 
groups constitute the pools of assessors that are often trained and used in workplace 
assessments (Krause & Thornton, 2009; Lievens, 2001a). In support of this point, a survey of 
AC selection and development programs of 144 organizations in 18 countries (Thornton & 
Krause, 2009) reported that 70% used line managers, whereas external (44%) or internal 
(22%) psychologists were also a popular choice. 
Previous studies also found some rating differences between these two populations. 
For example, Barr and Hitt (1986) examined the selection decisions of professional 
interviewers and students and found significant differences in the number and nature of 
factors used. In several studies, Lievens (2001a, 2001b, 2002) found that psychology students 
were better able to provide distinct assessment center ratings than managers. Lievens 
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attributed these findings on psychology students’ education that had versed them more into 
the notion of psychological constructs and their behavioral indicators. 
Although these prior studies hint that a dispositional reasoning measure might work 
differently for psychology students and managers, no earlier studies have considered the 
measurement invariance of dispositional reasoning across both of these groups. Measurement 
invariance (Millsap, 2011) determines whether “an assessment instrument is measuring the 
same constructs in exactly the same way across groups” (Byrne & Stewart, 2006, p. 287). 
Without invariance between managers and psychology students, between-group comparisons 
of test scores may be misleading: that is, we would not be sure if observed group differences 
are ‘real’ or confounded with differences in the structure of the constructs and/or functioning 
of the measurement scales (Cheung, 2008). Only when the measurement structure is invariant 
between these two populations, dispositional reasoning scores can be compared across these 
assessor groups. 
Method 
Participants 
Combined sample. For our study, it was important to limit the sample to participants 
that form part of a broader population of potential assessors. Therefore, a combined sample 
(N = 321) of managers (49.8%) and psychology students (50.2%) was selected because these 
are the people who are most likely to be trained as assessors (Krause & Thornton, 2009). The 
combined sample (54.4% females and 45.6% males) comprised 46.3% Black African, 35.8% 
White, 11.1% Mixed Race and 5.9% Asian/Indian participants. Their mean age was 32.72 
(SD = 11.13) years. English was the official workplace language of all participants, although 
the prevalent first languages amongst these respondents were English (40.8%) and Afrikaans 
(19%). 
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Group 1: Psychology students. We recruited 161 students in Industrial-
Organizational Psychology from two universities in South Africa. Students were at various 
levels of academic seniority, although most (59.5%) were postgraduates (i.e., they had 
finished their Bachelor’s degrees and were doing Honors- or Masters-degrees at the time of 
the study). The rest were Bachelor’s students. 
Group 2: Managers. Our second group consisted of 160 managerial personnel2 
working in various line and staff functions (e.g., HRM, finance, etc.) within two 
organizations: a national police training academy and a supervisor training college. All of 
these respondents were undergoing staff development training when they were assessed. 
A comparison of the two samples showed that managers were generally older (M = 
42.3 yrs., SD = 6.7 yrs.) than psychology students (M = 22.8 yrs., SD = 3.5 yrs.), t(221.02) = 
31.142, p < .001. The samples differed in terms of ethnic composition, as managers were 
predominantly African (71.4%), as compared to students whom were mostly White (55.6%). 
Procedure 
The data collection was completed in multiple sessions within the respective 
organizations. After introducing the research as part of assessor training to develop self-
insight about their dispositional reasoning, we explained participants’ rights and requested 
their informed consent. Next, participants independently completed the research 
questionnaire, before they were debriefed and thanked for their participation. Following their 
study participation, assessors each received an individual feedback report summarizing their 
performance on the measure. 
Measures 
 Dispositional reasoning. To measure the dispositional reasoning components, we 
used the Revised Interpersonal Judgment Inventory (R-IJI)(De Kock, et al., 2015)—a 
revision of the original IJI (Christiansen et al., 2005) (Christiansen, et al., 2005). The Revised 
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IJI consisted of 64 items that measure three components. Example items for each subscale 
may be found in Appendix A. 
Induction. The induction component of dispositional reasoning was measured by 20 
items that tapped candidates’ ability to make correct behavior-trait inferences. After 
describing the Big Five personality traits, a list of adjectives from Goldberg’s (1992) factor 
markers were presented. The task was to identify the traits (e.g., conscientiousness) that best 
matched the marker adjectives (e.g., thorough). 
 Extrapolation. The extrapolation component of dispositional reasoning was measured 
by 23 items assessing a respondent’s understanding of how traits and behaviors co-occur. 
Items described a fictional person in terms of traits and behaviors and required respondents to 
select which of four descriptions was most (or least) likely also true of the person. 
Contextualization. The contextualization component of dispositional reasoning was 
measured by 21 items that test understanding of trait–situation relevance. On the basis of 
empirical results from an earlier study (Tett & Guterman, 2000) one response option for each 
item was keyed as being the most consistent with empirical evidence, theoretical 
relationships, and expert judgment. One subset of items presented a trait description, for 
instance ‘empathy’, by listing examples of behaviors associated with high and low scorers on 
the trait. Next, respondents had to choose which of five situations would most likely elicit the 
relevant behavior. 
Biographical characteristics. To enable normative comparisons, we also requested 
respondents’ biographical details. 
Statistical Analysis 
In order to evaluate the latent structure of the revised dispositional reasoning measure, 
we conducted both lower-order and higher-order confirmatory factor analysis (HCFA). First-
order CFA was used to assess the measurement model fit of both the global factor (M1) and 
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three-component (M2) models. Consequently, HCFA was used to evaluate the higher-order 
model (M3). Hierarchical factor analysis is often used when it is posited that specialized 
facets of intelligence (e.g., verbal reasoning, memory) are influenced by a broader dimension 
of intelligence (g). In higher-order factor analysis, the factor correlations at a lower level (i.e., 
between specialized facets of a broader construct) become the input matrix for the higher-
order factor analysis. The HCFA attempts to provide a more parsimonious account for the 
inter-correlations among lower-order factors (Brown, 2015). 
Robust maximum likelihood (RML) estimation was employed to estimate all models, 
unless stated otherwise. We used a number of fit indices to evaluate model fit, including 
SBχ2(Satorra & Bentler, 1988), CFI, RMSEA (and its 90% confidence intervals), and SRMR. 
As recommended by Byrne and Stewart (2006), the following minimum cut-offs were 
applied to infer acceptable model fit: SBχ2 (Satorra & Bentler, 1988) with p >.05; CFI > .95; 
RMSEA < .08; and SRMR < .08. Our analyses were conducted with Lisrel 9.2 (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 2015). 
Data preparation for HCFA. Before we conducted the higher-order confirmatory 
factor analysis, we addressed a number of statistical issues. 
Item-to-sample size ratio. Our complete measure had 64 individual items. We 
decided not to conduct HCFA of the full measurement model on item-level data in this study 
because the number of parameters to be estimated in a model with 64 observed variables—
one for each item —would have led to inadequate statistical power (MacCallum, Browne, & 
Sugawara, 1996; Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013). Therefore, we reduced the 
number of items in the scales to allow for sufficient power and ensure appropriate model 
identification—issues that were important for the subsequent hierarchical model analyses. 
Upon inspection of the issues associated with reducing the number of items in the scales (see 
Chongming Yang, Nay, & Hoyle, 2010) we decided to create four indicator variables for 
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each first-order latent variable by using parcels of items within each scale as manifest 
variables, using the procedures outlined by Little, Cunningham, Shahar, and Widaman 
(2002). Our parceling strategy is explained in Appendix B. Using parcels in CFA has distinct 
advantages: Not only do they allow retaining measurement information from many items, but 
in most conditions, less biased parameter estimates result when parcels are used (Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson, 2010). However, we acknowledge that combining items into parcels may 
also artificially enhance the reliability estimates of scores from the measure (Hair, et al., 
2010). 
Model specification. The hierarchical CFA model (see Fig 3) hypothesizes for both 
managers and psychology students the following (in line with Byrne and Stewart, 2006): (a) a 
dispositional reasoning structure is best represented by a single higher-order factor of 
dispositional reasoning and three lower-order factors (trait induction, trait extrapolation, and 
trait contextualization); (b) each observed variable (i.e., parcel) has a non-zero loading on the 
lower-order factor it was intended to measure and zero loadings on other factors (i.e., zero 
cross-loadings); (c) covariation among the three lower-order factors is explained by the 
higher-order factor of dispositional reasoning; (d) measurement error terms are uncorrelated; 
and (e) factor disturbances are uncorrelated. 
Model identification. To identify a hierarchical CFA model, it must have at least three 
first-order factors, and the latter should have at least two indicators each (Kline, 2011). The 
hierarchical model (M3) that we hypothesized (see Figure 3) satisfies both these 
requirements: Our model has three first-order factors and five indicator variables for each 
first-order factor. However, the second-order portion of the model must also be identified in 
itself. As a solution that specifies a single second-order factor over three first-order factors is 
just-identified (Brown, 2015), the residuals of induction and extrapolation were constrained 
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to be equal (using a procedure outlined by Byrne, 2011) to achieve identification at the 
higher-order level of the model. 
Latent variable scaling. In addition to adequate model identification, it was necessary 
to scale the second-order factor of dispositional reasoning in the model because it has no 
observed measures and must be provided a metric (Brown, 2015). We decided to fix the 
variance of the second-order dispositional reasoning factor to 1.0 because it left all three 
direct effects of dispositional reasoning on the first-order factors as free parameters. 
Higher-order CFA procedure. After completing the data preparation, we followed the 
general sequence of higher-order confirmatory factor analysis (HCFA) proposed by Brown 
(2015), which was to: (1) develop a ‘well-behaved’ first-order CFA solution, in other words, 
one that fits well and is conceptually valid; (2) examine the magnitude and pattern of 
correlations among factors in the first-order model; and (3) fit the second-order model, based 
on conceptual and empirical grounds. 
Measurement invariance (MI). Finally, we conducted measurement invariance 
analysis (Millsap, 2011) of the best fitting factor model between managers and psychology 
student samples. To establish the measurement invariance of the first-order models of the 
factor structure underlying our measure of dispositional reasoning, between managers and 
psychology students, we followed available guidelines for general measurement invariance 
(e.g., Brown, 2015; Millsap, 2011; Raykov, Marcoulides, & Li, 2012; Vandenberg & Lance, 
2000), but also specific guidelines to assess invariance of hierarchical models (e.g., Byrne & 
Stewart, 2006; Chen, Sousa, & West, 2005; Cheung, 2008). Our testing strategy involved 
hierarchical steps comparing the fit of a series of more constrained models with less 
constrained models, relying on the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) at 
each step. The LR test involves a comparison of the χ2-values of the unconstrained and 
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constrained models and statistically significant increase in χ2 as a result of constraining a 
specific set of parameters was used as a criterion for rejecting measurement invariance. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 and Figure 4 portray the mean dispositional reasoning scores (overall, and by 
component) for managers and psychology students. Results from an independent samples t 
test indicated that psychology students (M = .76, SD = .10, N = 161) scored higher on overall 
dispositional reasoning than managers (M = .45, SD = .14, N = 161), t(287.8) = -22.2, p < 
.001, two-tailed. The difference of .31 scale points was substantial (scale range: 0 to 100%; d 
= 2.55, large effect size r = .79, Cohen, 1988) and the 95% confidence interval around the 
difference between the group means was relatively precise (33.7 to 28.2). As a possible 
reason, psychology students’ education might verse them more into the notion of 
psychological constructs and their behavioral indicators (Lievens, 2001a, 2001b, 2002). 
For the sake of brevity, the mean differences across the two subsamples for 
component scores are not reported; however they were all statistically significant, p < .001. 
Table 1 also reports the intercorrelation (uncorrected for unreliability) between the 
dispositional reasoning component scores for the two subsamples. 
Assessment of Models 
General factor model (M1). Model assessment was conducted by testing a series of 
confirmatory factor analytic models. The results of these tests are reported in Table 2 for the 
combined sample. Table 3 reports the results separately for managers and psychology 
students. The general factor model (M1, see Figure 3) of dispositional reasoning was assessed 
by a first-order confirmatory factor analysis based on data from the combined sample. The 
fifteen item parcels serve as indicators of the general dispositional reasoning factor. The 
general factor model (M1) was tested and the fit was acceptable, χ2(90, N = 321) = 191.50, p 
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< .001, Satorra-Bentler χ2 (90, N = 321) = 180.99, p < .001, Robust CFI = .96, TLI = .95, 
RMSEA = .06, 90% CI: [0.05; 0.07], although the relative large chi-square statistic suggested 
the need for further model improvement. 
Three-component model (M2). Next, we evaluated a three-component factor model, 
with trait induction, trait extrapolation and trait induction as separate components (see Figure 
2). The three factors were hypothesized to co-vary with one another and the respective item 
parcels created from each of the subscale items serve as indicators of the respective factors. A 
three-component model showed relatively good fit, χ2(87, N = 321) = 117.60, p = .016, 
Satorra-Bentler χ2 (87, N = 321) = 113.29, p < .05, Robust CFI = .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = 
.03, 90% CI: [0.015; 0.048]. All fifteen item parcels (three first-order latent variables with 
five item parcels each) were significant indicators of their respective latent factors. We 
inspected the results of the phi matrix providing the correlations among the latent variables 
(or factors) and consistent with our expectation, all factors were significantly interrelated 
(range of zs = 6.76 – 10.48). Factor intercorrelations (amongst the various subdimensions of 
the dispositional reasoning components, M2) were generally large (.84 < φ < .95). So, the 
pattern of correlations speaks to the feasibility of the suggested second-order model (which 
posited that trait induction, trait extrapolation and trait contextualization are more specific 
dimensions of broad underlying dispositional reasoning). 
Hierarchical factor model (M3). Finally, a hierarchical (2nd-order) factor model of 
dispositional reasoning—this model proposes a general component, influencing the three 
specific components of induction, extrapolation, and contextualization—was tested and 
support was found because the model showed good fit, χ2 (87, N = 321) = 117.60, p = .016, 
Satorra-Bentler χ2 (87, N = 321) = 113.29, p < .05, Robust CFI = .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = 
.03, 90% CI: [0.015; 0.048]. Despite being just-identified, the magnitude and statistical 
significance of the factor loadings in the higher-order part of the model may be meaningfully 
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interpreted (Brown, 2015). Looking at our results (the completely standardized estimates 
from the solution), each of the first-order factors loads strongly on the second-order 
dispositional reasoning factor: induction (γ = .98) and extrapolation (γ = .96) loaded more 
strongly than contextualization (γ = .88). As such, dispositional reasoning as a higher-order 
factor accounted for substantial proportions of variance in the individual components: 
induction 96% (1 - .04), extrapolation 91.5% (1 - .085), and contextualization 77.1% (1 - 
.229). 
Model Comparison 
We compared the baseline model (general factor model, M1) with the comparison 
models. A chi-square difference test (Bryant & Satorra, 2012, 2013) indicated that the nested 
model (M2) showed significantly poorer fit compared to the baseline (M1) general-factor 
model, Satorra-Bentler χ2diff(3, N = 321) = 45.033, p < .001. Therefore, the three-component 
model of dispositional reasoning fitted significantly better than a general-factor model. 
We also compared a model in which the correlations between dispositional reasoning 
were freely estimated; and a nested comparison model in which the correlations were 
constrained to be unity3. We used the raw data as input for the analysis and found relatively 
poor fit of the nested model, χ2 (90, N = 321) = 189.843, p < .01, RMSEA = .06 (90% CI: 
.04; .07). A chi-square difference test indicated that the nested model (specifying the 
relationship between dispositional reasoning facets as perfectly correlated) showed 
significantly poorer fit, compared to the baseline model, χ2diff(3, N = 321) = 72.303, p < .001. 
Therefore, the evidence suggests that the components are empirically distinct from one 
another. 
The goodness of fit of the hierarchical model (M3) is the same as the three-
component first-order model (M2) in which factors are allowed to co-vary freely. According 
to Brown (2015), this is because a solution that specifies a single second-order factor over 
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three first-order factors is just-identified (Brown, 2015) and, therefore, it is not appropriate to 
statistically compare M3 with M2. Only when the higher-order model is over-identified, can 
the nested χ2 be used to determine whether the specification in M3 produces a significant 
degradation in fit relative to the first-order solution. 
However, apart from the higher-order solution not resulting in a decrease in model fit, 
it also provides a more parsimonious account for the correlations among the first-order 
factors. So, a higher-order model with dispositional reasoning as a general factor in turn 
influencing induction, extrapolation, and contextualization, explains variance in test scores 
better than a general factor model. The model fit strategy outlined above (for testing M1, M2, 
and M3) was repeated in each separate subsample and the results are reported in Table 3. 
Measurement Invariance 
To compare the factor structure of dispositional reasoning between managers and 
psychology students, we conducted measurement invariance analyses (see Table 4). In line 
with the suggestions of Brown (2015), a baseline model was first established in each group, 
followed by tests of equivalence across groups at each of several increasingly stringent levels 
of invariance. 
First-order (M2) invariance. 
Preliminary analyses. It is preferable to conduct multiple-groups CFA with relatively 
balanced sample sizes, as was the case in the present study (managers: N = 160; students: N = 
161). The Robust ML estimator was used in estimation of all models and, therefore, all 
analyses are based on the Satorra-Bentler scaled statistic (SBχ2; Satorra & Bentler, 1988). To 
evaluate all models we relied on SBχ2, as well as on CFI, the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), and SRMR, in line with the recommendations of Byrne and 
Stewart (2006). The evaluation criteria we apply for each fit index are outlined in Byrne and 
Stewart (2006): Values that adhere to the following cut-offs indicate significant reduction in 
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fit when comparing two nested models: (1) if corrected ΔSBχ2/Δdf shows statistical 
significance; (2) ΔCFI >.01; and (3) the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) > 
.08. The first item parcel within each subscale was used as a marker indicator to define the 
metric of the latent variable. 
Testing for baseline models. As the estimation of baseline models involves no 
between-group constraints, the data were analyzed separately for each group. Prior to 
conducting the multiple-groups CFA, we ensured that the suggested three-factor model is 
acceptable in both groups. As shown in Table 4, overall fit statistics for the three-factor 
solution are consistent with good model fit in both managers and psychology students. On 
both groups, all freely estimated factor loadings are statistically significant (all ps < .01). 
Testing for configural invariance. Configural invariance represents the observance 
of the same number of factors and factor loading pattern across groups—no parameter 
equality constraints are imposed. For this model, as with subsequent tests in our invariance 
analysis where equality constraints are imposed on particular parameters, data for the two 
groups are analyzed simultaneously in a file combining data for both groups to obtain 
estimates. Given that the baseline models are now fitted simultaneously in a multigroup 
evaluation, the criterion for configural invariance is that goodness-of-fit should indicate a 
well-fitting model. So, we conducted the simultaneous analysis of equal form. As shown in 
Table 4, this solution provides an acceptable fit to the data. This solution (i.e., configural 
model) serves as the baseline model for subsequent tests of measurement invariance and 
population heterogeneity. 
Testing for factor loading invariance. In this step, equality constraints are imposed for 
all freely estimated first-order factor loadings (except for three items fixed to 1.00 for the 
purposes of latent variable scaling). Invariance for this step holds if goodness-of-fit is 
adequate and if there is minimal degradation in fit from the configural model. The analysis 
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evaluates whether factor loadings (unstandardized) of the dispositional reasoning component 
indicators are equivalent in managers and psychology students. In our data, the equal factor 
loadings models had an overall good fit to the data, although it significantly degraded fit 
relative to the equal form solution, χ2diff(12) = 39.60, p < .001. As this value is statistically 
significant, it suggests that the constraints of equal factor loadings in the restricted model do 
not hold (Byrne & Stewart, 2006), suggesting that the two models are not equivalent across 
the manager and psychology student groups. As the constraint of equal factor loadings 
significantly degrades the fit of the solution, it can be concluded that the indicators do not 
evidence comparable relationships to the latent constructs of dispositional reasoning 
components in managers and psychology students (Brown, 2015). This means that a unit 
change in the underlying latent variable is not associated with statistically equivalent change 
in the observed measures (item parcels4) in both groups. 
A closer look at the factor loadings revealed that the mean factor loading for managers 
was .57 (SD = .12) and for psychology students .48 (SD = .13). Of these, 80% were invariant 
(within 1.96 SD). The three loadings that were not invariant (> 1.96 SD) were equally spread 
across components. A failure to demonstrate metric invariance (i.e., factor loadings are not 
equivalent across the two groups) was sufficient evidence to terminate the evaluation of 
further constraints. The results of further tests are reported in Table 4, however. Overall, from 
these results we conclude that only partial measurement invariance (Byrne, Shavelson, & 
Muthén, 1989) between managers and psychology students exists for our measure. 
Discussion 
This study contributes to the small albeit growing literature on dispositional reasoning 
as a key construct by investigating its dimensionality through a more comprehensive set of 
confirmatory factor analysis models (hierarchical, component models, and general factor-
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models). In addition, we test the invariance of this measure across two samples (psychology 
students and managers) that are often trained in workplace assessments. 
Results supported an hierarchically-configured model for dispositional reasoning, 
with a general factor at a higher stratum driving three specific facets (trait induction, trait 
extrapolation, and trait contextualization) at a lower stratum. Moreover, the hierarchical 
model showed acceptable fit within both our psychology students and manager samples. So, 
we found evidence for a relatively common factor structure for dispositional reasoning in 
both samples. However, we also observed some lack of metric invariance for the 
dispositional reasoning measure between managers and students, in other words, the factor 
loadings were overall not equivalent between managers and students. 
Follow-up analyses showed that only three (20%) observed variables showed 
substantial differences in factor loadings between the two groups. It is possible that our 
invariance tests were conservative in the sense that a minority of observed variables, with 
large (> 1.96 SD) differences in factor loadings between groups, led to failure of the overall 
test for metric invariance. We also considered the location of the non-invariant items within 
the component measures: The “offending” observed variables were not located within 
particular dispositional reasoning components, but rather, they were evenly spread. 
Moreover, the item content of the non-invariant observed variables did not reveal any clear 
pattern that may have provided a theoretical explanation for the differences in factor loadings 
between managers in psychology students.  Regarding the overall strength of factor loadings 
between the two groups, the mean factor loading (across items) for managers (.57) was 
higher than psychology students (.48), which may have contributed to the failure in the 
invariance test. The overall lower factor loading of the student group may have resulted, in 
part, from the relatively lower dispersion in their item responses, that is, students showed 
lower variability than managers and they did better overall on the measure. 
MEASUREMENT OF DISPOSITIONAL REASONING 23 
 
Descriptive statistics showed that psychology students outperformed managers on the 
measure of dispositional reasoning by a substantial margin. As noted, earlier studies revealed 
also other differences between managers and psychology students. For example, prior studies 
reported that psychology students were better able to provide distinct assessment center 
ratings than managers (Lievens, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) and differed from managers in the 
number and nature of factors they used for selection decisions (Barr & Hitt, 1986). One 
interpretation is that—as compared to managers—psychology students may have better 
developed schemas that relate to understanding traits, behaviors, and situations, by virtue of 
their education and professional training. However, it is important to qualify these 
explanations because metric equivalence is required in order to make meaningful between- 
group comparisons of the respective scores. Without metric equivalence, mean differences in 
scores between these groups cannot be unambiguously interpreted, because it is unclear 
whether score differences are due to actual differences in this ability (i.e., the schema-based 
explanation mentioned above), or to different psychometric responses to the scale items 
(Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). 
This study has several limitations. First, by grouping assessors into two relatively 
coarse categories (managers vs. psychology students) it may obscure other important 
individual differences within these groups, such as gender and ethnicity. More research is 
needed to see how stable are the reported factor solutions for dispositional reasoning between 
gender and ethnic groups. Second, the modest sample sizes that we used prohibited fitting our 
models using item-level data. Given the potential limitations of item parceling as a strategy 
(Little, et al., 2002) we also fitted the measurement models first at the item level in the 
combined sample. In addition, we tested the effect of different parceling strategies on the 
study’s final results—the choice of parceling strategy did not change the substantive 
conclusions. Third, we did not include psychologists in our study, although psychologists are 
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also an important group of assessors in practice (Krause & Thornton, 2009). Future studies 
should investigate the measurement properties of our dispositional reasoning measure in a 
sample of psychologists. 
In terms of future research, we see the following avenues. First, studies should 
consider the measurement of dispositional reasoning across different cultures. Our measure is 
based on the Big Five personality framework. Although this framework is relatively 
universal, personality traits may be expressed in unique ways across cultures (Church, 2000; 
Heine & Buchtel, 2009). Moreover, people from different cultures may have idiosyncratic 
interpretations of the same observed behavior and how it clusters into constructs (Willmann, 
Feldt, & Amelang, 1997). As such, cultural groups may score differently on a common set of 
items that tap into knowledge and understanding of trait concepts. They may have different 
psychometric responses to the scale items (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). So, we recommend 
that future studies consider measurement invariance and mean differences between different 
cultural groups. 
Another issue for future studies is to further evaluate the discriminant validity of our 
dispositional reasoning measure, to show that it is distinct from general mental ability and 
other abilities (spatial, analytical, problem-solving, etc.) and personality (attention to detail, 
empathy, emotional intelligence, etc.) that are often used in ‘good judge’ studies. 
Finally, a fruitful avenue is to consider whether or not dispositional reasoning is 
independent of the trait or content being assessed. Dispositional reasoning may be understood 
broadly as the ability to reason about traits and dispositions. Our measure (as with the 
measure of Christiansen et al., 2005) was ‘cast in the mold’ of the Big 5 personality 
framework. This typology was a good place to start because it is an overarching framework 
that is generally accepted. However, in principle we could develop a test that measures 
people’s knowledge about any dispositions, just like with tests of general mental ability 
MEASUREMENT OF DISPOSITIONAL REASONING 25 
 
different stimulus material can be used in different sets of items. Therefore, measures can be 
developed also for other referent constructs (e.g., interview dimensions, see Huffcutt, 
Conway, Roth, & Stone, 2001). 
Our findings suggest some implications for practice. As noted, measures of 
dispositional reasoning may be useful for both groups because they represent the pools of 
assessors that are often trained in workplace assessments (Krause & Thornton, 2009; 
Lievens, 2001a). In our analyses, an hierarchical model with three-components showed the 
best fit, suggesting that organizations may develop assessor training interventions to target 
specific components (induction, extrapolation, or contextualization) and they might report 
both an overall dispositional reasoning score, as well as sub-scores for the three components. 
Moreover, lack of measurement invariance suggests that some adjustments to the 
dispositional reasoning measure might be needed according to the respective group (i.e., 
managers vs. psychology students).  
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Footnotes 
1Psychology students represent an important group of assessors in our study, given 
that they are normally trained as psychologist assessors. 
2Some manager respondents (n = 146) were also included in another study 
investigating the criterion-related validity of dispositional reasoning scores (De Kock, et al., 
2015). 
3We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
4As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the fundamental meaning of our 
invariance tests for factor loadings would have been clearer if we had used individual test 
items, rather than item parcels.
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for the Managers and Psychology-students 
Samples 
     Variables Descriptives 1 2 3 4 
 M (SD) Correlations for managers (n = 160) 
1. Induction .37 (.18) (α = .74)    
2. Extrapolation .47 (.16) .56** (α = .66)   
3. Contextualization .51 (.19)  .47** .44** (α = .75)  
4. Total DR .44 (.15) .83** .80**   .80** (α = .85) 
  Correlations for psychology-students (n = 161) 
1. Induction .74 (.16) (α = .69)    
2. Extrapolation .77 (.10) .53** (α = .44a)   
3. Contextualization .77 (.13)  .53** .36** (α = .59)  
4. Total DR .76 (.10) .87** .74**   .79** (α = .79) 
Note. Total N = 321. DR = Dispositional reasoning total scores. aLower reliabilities for 
students are likely due to substantial lower dispersion for this sample. For example, 
psychology students had lower mean item variance (.14 vs .21) and scale variance (5.46 
vs 13.09) for extrapolation, as compared to the manager sample. When the two samples 
were combined, the alphas were higher: full measure (.93), induction (.86), extrapolation 
(.82), and contextualization (.82). 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
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Figures 
Figure 1. A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of dispositional reasoning: A general 
factor model (Model M1). Only nine indicator variables are used in this example, as 
demonstration. 
 
Figure 2. A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of dispositional reasoning: A three-
component (first-order) model (M2). Only nine indicator variables are used in this example, 
as demonstration. 
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Figure 3. A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of dispositional reasoning: 
Hierarchical (2nd order) model (Model M3). Only nine indicator variables are used in this 
example, as demonstration. 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of mean scores (%) for dispositional reasoning and its components 
(induction, extrapolation, and contextualization) between managers and psychology students. 
The y-axis is interpreted as follows: 0% = no correct answers and 100% = all items correct. 
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Appendix A 
Example Items from the Dispositional Reasoning Test 
Trait induction 
Circle the letter that corresponds most to the trait you think is represented by the word: 
 Trait
 
Behavior 
Emotional 
stability 
Extraversion Openness Agreeableness Conscientious-
ness 
Sloppy     X
Irritable X     
 
 
Trait extrapolation 
For example, one item depicted ‘John’ as “John's co-workers all describe him as efficient, 
thorough, and persistent. MOST likely John also:”. Next, respondents had to choose the best 
answer from the following options: 
A.   feels the need to be around lot of people, 
B.   has a great deal of sympathy for those less fortunate, 
C.   doesn't often give in to his impulses, 
D.   enjoys fantasizing and daydreaming. 
Clearly, only option (C), ‘doesn’t often give in to his impulses’ relates to the focal trait 
(conscientiousness) in the original person description. 
 
Trait contextualization  
For example, one item stated “Which of the following situations is most relevant to 
the trait of organization?”. Then, respondents had to select the most appropriate answer from 
three options (correct answer in bold): 
 A. You are busy with a task and people continuously interrupt you 
B. On your way home you drive past a broken down vehicle 
C. Over the last two years, you have been employed at a job that entails working by 
yourself. Your boss offers you a chance to do essentially the same thing, but in a 
group of co-workers 
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Appendix B 
Parceling Strategy: Dimensionality Considerations 
An appropriate parceling strategy should be identified given the dimensionality of the 
factor structure underlying a set of item scores. Exploratory factor analysis of our item-level 
data (using Principal Axis Factoring, with Oblimin rotation, considered appropriate for our 
data, as suggested by Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) indicated possible multidimensionality 
within all three first-order factors, namely for induction, extrapolation, and contextualization. 
However, we also had to consider the possibility that multidimensionality within each 
component of dispositional reasoning may be due to statistical artefacts. For example, 
multiple dimensions may also be artificially created when items vary in terms of their 
difficulty levels. Even if various items measure the same construct, the resulting correlation 
coefficients between these items may be low if the response thresholds vary much (Lord & 
Novick, 1968). As a result, techniques that are based on correlations, such as factor analysis, 
may cause artefacts in the form of spurious ‘difficulty factors’ with little if any psychological 
meaning (Bernstein & Teng, 1989; Reise, Waller, & Comrey, 2000). Stated otherwise, it is 
possible that items with similar distributions may tend to form factors irrespective of their 
item content. The p-values of the 64 items in our combined dispositional reasoning measure 
varied (Mp = .61; SDp = 17; Minp = .20; Maxp = .93). 
Although some authors (e.g., Bandalos & Finney, 2001) argue that parceling should 
be reserved for conditions of uni-dimensionality, Little and colleagues (2002) suggest two 
specific strategies for parceling items when item scores indicate a multidimensional factor 
structure. First, an internal consistency approach creates parcels that use the facets observed 
as grouping criteria. In this approach, items contained within a facet are clustered to form a 
combined item parcel, yielding internally consistent facets as manifest indicators of the 
higher stratum construct and keeping the multidimensional nature of the construct explicit. 
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Second, the domain-representative approach is a method that creates parcels by joining items 
from different facets into combined item clusters. For example, a parcel would contain items 
from each facets identified through dimensionality analysis. So, each parcel reflects all of the 
facets present within a set of items—this solution accounts for the multidimensionality 
inherent in a set of items. The domain representation approach has shown to be superior in 
some studies (e.g., Kishton & Widaman, 1994). Finally, a random item assignment strategy 
may be used. We decided to utilize random item assignment as a parceling strategy, as it 
recognizes the possibility that difficulty factors may cause spurious dimensions within each 
component of dispositional reasoning. We also ran the analyses using the two other parceling 
strategies—the choice of parceling strategy had no substantive effect on the final results. 
